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ABSTRACT
CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment
of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols,
CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the
nodes would play by the rules. This is important, since
the nodes themselves control their random deferment.
However, with the higher programmability of the network
adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or
firmware is likely to grow; in this way, a user could ob-
tain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at
the expense of other users.
We use a game-theoretic approach to investigate the
problem of the selfish behavior of nodes, specifically
geared towards the most widely accepted protocol in this
class of protocols, IEEE 802.11. We show that a self-
ish and non-cooperative behavior by a small population
of (two or more) cheaters leads to a network collapse.
We argue that this provides an incentive for cheaters to
cooperate with each other. However, explicit coopera-
tion among nodes is clearly impractical. By applying
the model of dynamic games borrowed from game the-
ory, we derive the conditions for the stable and optimal
functioning of a population of cheaters. We use this in-
sight to develop a simple, localized and distributed cheat-
ing protocol that needs no explicit cooperation between
cheaters or a priori knowledge about the total number of
nodes/cheaters in the system. We show that the scheme
successfully guides multiple selfish nodes to a Pareto-
optimal Nash equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
∗The work presented in this paper was supported (in
part) by the National Competence Center in Research
on Mobile Information and Communication Systems
(NCCR-MICS), a center supported by the Swiss National
Science Foundation under grant number 5005-67322.
(http://www.terminodes.org)
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Carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) protocols rely on the random deferment of
packet transmissions for the efficient use of the shared
wireless channel among many nodes in a network; in spite
of its shortcomings, this class of MAC protocols is one of
the most popular for ad hoc networks.
It is in general assumed that all nodes respect the rules
of the protocol. However, we claim that this assumption
is less and less legitimate, because the network adapters
are becoming more and more programmable. As a result,
a user can today very easily modify the behavior of its
wireless interface.
In this paper, we study wireless ad hoc networks contain-
ing one or several selfish users. By “selfish” we designate
the users who are ready to tamper with their wireless in-
terface in order to increase their own share of the common
transmission resource; we assume these users to be ratio-
nal, and not malicious (hence they are ready to harm
other users only if they can derive a benefit from this
misbehavior).
More specifically, we consider that a cheater makes use
of the easiest (and yet highly rewarding) cheating tech-
nique, namely it does deliberately not respect the random
deferment of the transmission of its own packets (see Fig-
ure 1).
Although this cheating technique is straightforward, we
show that studying its implications is far from trivial. In
order to be able to corroborate our simulations with an-
alytical results, we make use of game theory: each node1
is a player, the throughput it enjoys is its payoff, and the
size of its contention window represents its move.
By making use of this model and of extensive simulations,
we study several problems in a systematic way. First,
1In the rest of the paper, we do not distinguish between
the user and his or her node.
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Figure 1: Using a configurable IEEE 802.11b
wireless card, (such as Atheros used here), a
cheater can reduce his contention window size to
increase his share of throughput at the expense
of the well-behaved node; error bars show max
and min values of 5 real tests; two nodes (includ-
ing the cheater) send full data rate UDP flows
to a common destination; channel capacity is 11
Mbits/s.
we consider the simple case of a network with a single
cheater. We then assume the presence of several cheaters,
and show that, without appropriate precautions, the net-
work collapses. We compute the Pareto-optimal point of
operation of such a system, and study the equilibria of
dynamic games. We introduce the notion of cooperative
players, namely cheaters who try to continue operating at
the Pareto-optimal point of operation. We also propose
a detection and a punishment technique against those
players who exhibit a non-cooperative behavior. Finally,
we explain how the players can collectively search for the
optimal point of operation, even if they are unaware of
the number of nodes present in the network.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to provide a systematic analysis of rational cheating in
CSMA/CA networks. To make it as concrete as pos-
sible, we refer to the most prominent incarnation of
CSMA/CA, namely IEEE 802.11; however, the con-
clusions we derive are valid for any protocol of the
CSMA/CA family.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section addresses the related work. Section 3 describes
the system model considered in the paper. Section 4
studies the case of a static game, whereas Section 5 stud-
ies the case of a dynamic game. Section 6 shows the
distributed implementation of the repeated game and its
evaluation. Section 7 analyzes the distributed cheating
protocol. Last, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
The problem of non-cooperative nodes in ad hoc networks
has been widely addressed on the network layer, whereas
little work has been done on the MAC layer. MacKenzie
and Wicker [1] study the problem of selfish users in Aloha
from a game-theoretic point of view. They analyze the
stability of the system (Nash equilibrium), and calculate
the transmission probabilities that optimize each node’s
throughput. They assume however that all nodes have
the same transmission rates and costs. Moreover, every
node has an a priori knowledge about the total number
of nodes in the system.
Altman et al. [2] reconsider the same Aloha “game” with
partial information, where the transmission probability is
adapted according to collision feedback only. They con-
sider two frameworks: team work and non-cooperative
game.
Jin and Kesidis [3] study non-cooperative equilibria of
Aloha networks for heterogeneous users.
For IEEE 802.11, Kyasanur and Vaidya [4] propose that
the receiver assigns the backoff value to be used by the
sender, so the former can detect any misbehavior of the
latter. If the sender deviates from the assigned value, it
will be assigned high backoff values on the next round to
compensate its deviation. As mentioned by the authors,
this mechanism has several limitations such as the pos-
sible collusion between sender and receiver, and mainly
the fundamental change to the protocol.
Konorski [5] proposes a misbehaviour resilient backoff al-
gorithm that exhibits the same limitation of changing the
current protocol.
There are similarities between non-cooperative games on
the MAC layer and on the transport layer [6]. From a
game-theoretic point of view, Akella et al. [6] analyze
the stability of a network where each node is capable
of changing its TCP congestion avoidance parameters to
individually increase its throughput.
Game theory has been applied in the study of optimal
routing [7, 8, 9], congestion control [10], power control
[11, 12], as well as incentive engineering in wireless access
networks [13].
3. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider N nodes, with radio communication capa-
bility, willing to transmit data to N designated receivers
(one per sender). In this study, we assume all the nodes
to be within the same communication range (i.e., each
node can hear any other node). This is to avoid com-
plications introduced by the hidden terminal problem.
Nodes use a CSMA/CA based protocol to resolve con-
tention at the MAC layer. In this paper, we will be deal-
ing exclusively with IEEE 802.11 [14]; we note that the
analysis carried out in this paper can also be extended
to other CSMA/CA based protocols. We further assume
each node to have authentic MAC layer identity. This
can be achieved by means of MAC layer authentication.
A possible way to relax this assumption is discussed in
Section 7. Finally, we assume that the nodes are static
and they always have packets (of the same size) to send.
We consider a scenario where out of N nodes, a subset
of C nodes deliberately fail to follow the IEEE 802.11
2
protocol. We designate this subset of nodes as cheaters.
There can be a number of ways in which a node can
cheat. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a model
in which a cheater is in the full control of modifying his
contention window size. In violation of the standard pro-
tocol, a cheater i initializes his window size to a lower
value in order to obtain a higher throughput. We will
call this lower value Wi throughout the paper. More-
over, a cheater does not respect the backoff principle and
keeps his contention window size fixed after a collision,
i.e. equal to Wi. This mode of cheating is the easiest for
potential cheaters, since it does not require to perform
changes in the operation of IEEE 802.11 protocol. As
a proof of concept, we set the contention window of the
Proxim Orinoco 802.11a/b/g Gold ComboCard [15] to
arbitrary values. However, the main conclusions of this
paper are applicable to any other cheating technique, and
to the wide range of Atheros chip-based wireless cards
(e.g. DLink, Linksys, Netgear and Proxim).
The relevance of these misbehaving techniques become
even higher with the emerging standards for the Qual-
ity of Service support, such as IEEE 802.11e [16]. This
last gives the users total control of the MAC parameters,
therefore enabling them to easily cheat.
A cheater is well aware that his decisions can cause dif-
ferent outcomes, only few of which are preferable to him.
Thus, a cheater has different preferences for different out-
comes. We assume that the cheaters in our model are
rational, i.e., they want to maximize their own benefit.
In this particular context, the cheaters want to maximize
the average throughput they receive ri.
This problem can easily be modelled in a game theory
framework. All the cheater nodes are the players in this
game. The strategy of each (cheater) player i consists in
setting the value of his contention window Wi such that
player i’s expected payoff (utility) Ui is maximized. In
this work, we define a player i’s utility to be equal to the
enjoyed throughput ri (i.e., Ui = ri).
4. STUDY OF A STATIC GAME
In this section, we first analyze the problem of misbe-
having from a perspective of a single cheater and then
consider more complex scenarios of multiple cheaters in
the system.
4.1 Variation of throughput with Wi
In [17], Bianchi presented a saturation throughput model
for the IEEE 802.11 protocol. Since we assume that a
cheater’s objective is to maximize his throughput (and we
assume he always has a packet to send), he will tend to
use the full channel capacity (i.e., the system will operate
at the saturation point). Therefore, we make use of the
same model as [17]. To estimate the throughput of IEEE
802.11, in a network with no misbehaving nodes, Bianchi
[17] used a two-dimensional Markov chain of m backoff
stages in which each stage represents the backoff time
counter of a node. A transition takes place upon collision
and successful transmission, to a higher stage and to the
first stage respectively.
Considering the stationary distribution of the chain, the
access probability τ of a node is derived as a function
of the number of levels m and the minimum contention
window value Wmin:
τ =
2
1 +Wmin + pWmin
∑m−1
i=0 (2p)
i
(1)
where p is the conditional probability that a transmitted
packet collides, that is:
p = 1− (1− τ)N−1 (2)
where N is the number of the contending nodes. Equa-
tions (1) and (2) form a system of two nonlinear equations
that has a unique solution [17].
The throughput enjoyed by a given node, which is the
average information payload transmitted in a slot time
over the average length of a slot time, can be computed
using Bianchi’s model as follows:
ri =
P si L
P sT s + P cT c + P iT i
(3)
where P si = τi
∏
j 6=i(1 − τj) is the probability that an
arbitrary station successfully transmits during a random
time slot; L is the average size of a packet; P s =
∑
k P
s
k ;
T s is the average time needed to transmit a packet of
size L (including the inter-frame spacing periods [17]);
P i =
∏
k(1 − τk) is the probability of the channel being
idle; T i is the duration of the idle period (a single slot);
P c = 1 − P i −
∑
k P
s
k is the probability of collision; T
c
is the average time spent in the collision. Note that for
the expression (3) we must have the following expression
satisfied: P s + P c + P i = 1.
We extend Bianchi’s model to describe a network with
misbehaving nodes. Two separate Markov chains are
considered. The first, with a single backoff stage, since
cheaters are assumed to fix their contetion windows, is
used to derive the cheaters’ access probabilities τ ci . The
second chain, similar to the one in [17], is used to derive
the access probabilities τ li of well-behaved nodes. The
conditional collision probabilities are derived considering
both well-behaved and cheating nodes access probabili-
ties.
As mentioned in Section 3, cheater i sets his contention
windows to some value CWmin = CWmax = Wi. There-
fore, cheater i has one backoff stage (m = 1), and his
accessing probability reduces to:
τ ci =
2
Wi + 1
(4)
The channel accessing probability for well behavedr-
nodes, τ l, is expressed by:
τ l =
2
1 +Wmin + plWmin
∑m−1
i=0 (2p
l)i
(5)
where
pl = 1− (1− τ l)N−C−1(1− τ c)C (6)
3
After some algebraic manipulation of equation (3), we
obtain the following expression for the throughput of a
cheater i:
ri =
τ ci c
i
1
τ ci c
i
2 + c
i
3
(7)
where ci1 = p−iL; c
i
2 = p−i(T
s − T i) − s−i(T
s − T c);
ci3 = (1−p−i−s−i)T
c+s−iT
s+p−iT
i; with the following
substitutions: p−i =
∏
j 6=i(1 − τ
c
j )
∏
k(1 − τ
l
k); s−i =∑
j 6=i τ
c
j
∏
k,d 6=j,i(1− τ
c
k)(1− τ
l
d).
It is important to notice here, that the only parameter
that a node has a control over is its own Wi. By varying
Wi, a node changes its own access probability τi, as well
as the access probabilities of the other nodes. The ex-
act dependency between these quantities can be deduced
from equations (4)-(6).
Let us assume that ri is a continuous function of Wi. Al-
though the accessing probabilities of other cheaters (and
thus expressions ci1, c
i
2 and c
i
3) loosely depend on τ
c
i , we
neglect this dependence for a first degree analysis. This
approximation allows us to elaborate a closed form ex-
pression of the first derivative of equation (7):
∂ri
∂Wi
=
∂ri
∂τ ci
∂τ ci
∂Wi
(8)
=
ci1c
i
3
(τ ci c
i
2 + c
i
3)
2
−2
(Wi + 1)2
(9)
which, for T s ≥ T c and τ cj < 1, j 6= i, is always negative
2.
We conclude that the expected received throughput ri is
a strictly decreasing function of Wi (for τ
c
j < 1, j 6=
i). Thus, by unilaterally decreasing its own Wi, a node
can increase its received throughput (except if τ ck = 1,
for some player k; we will treat this case later in the
text). Note that this conclusion would remain the same
even if we considered the dependence of c1, c2 and c3
on τ ci . In fact, by using this approximation, we actually
undermine the benefits of the cheater (the cheater gets
more throughput in reality, as will be shown shortly).
We will now verify this claim by simulations performed in
ns-2 [18]. The simulation setup3, shown in Table 1, con-
sists of N = 20 nodes randomly spread over a 100×100m
area, all within receive range of each others (no hid-
den nodes). Node X deliberately fails to adhere to the
protocol and tries to misbehave following the cheating
model presented in Section 3. Traffic sources are con-
stant bit rate, sending 1050-byte frames every 5 ms. This
is enough to saturate the 2 Mbits/s (1.6 Mbits/s effective
data rate) channel, even when a single node is transmit-
ting. The parameter values for the IEEE 802.11 protocol
are chosen according to the IEEE 802.11b standard [14].
2According to IEEE 802.11 [14] we have the following:
Ts = PHY header + MACheader + L + SIFS + σ +
ACK +DIFS + σ, Tc = PHY header+MACheader+
L+DIFS + σ, where σ is the propagation delay. From
this we conclude that T s ≥ T c holds.
3In the future, we will only mention the changes that are
Table 1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Propagation Free space
MAC 802.11b
Scheme Basic (No RTS/CTS)
Channel capacity 2 Mbits/s
Traffic sources CBR / UDP
1050-byte frames
each 5 ms
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Figure 2: Throughputs for 20 nodes, out of which
one is a cheater
Figure 2 plots the throughput obtained by cheater X, as
well as by each well-behaved node for different values of
WX . Simulation results show a good match with the an-
alytical results. The duration for each simulation run is
50 seconds and the results are averaged over 5 simulation
runs. As can be observed from the Figure 2, the cheater
can increase his expected payoff (received throughput) by
choosing a small value ofWX . Furthermore, the through-
put obtained by the cheater increases monotonically with
the decrease in WX .
A cheater gets the best throughput by setting his con-
tention window size (WX) to 1. Note that WX = 1
corresponds to the case when the cheater accesses the
channel right after DIFS, i.e., his access probability τ is
equal to 1.
4.2 Nash equilibrium of a static game
Based on the cheaters’ payoff function defined above,
in this subsection, we will see that a network is always
headed towards collapse when there is no explicit (or im-
plicit) cooperation between cheaters. We will use a model
of static games. A static game is one in which all play-
ers make decisions (or select a strategy) simultaneously,
without knowledge of the strategies that are being cho-
sen by other players. This model represents well the ad
hoc setting where explicit cooperation between nodes is
impractical. The solution concept we will be using to
study the equilibrium of the static game is Nash equilib-
done from this reference simulation setup.
4
rium [19]. In this study we do not consider well-behaved
nodes.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy
profile W = (W1, . . . ,WC), which is the set of contention
window values used by players, is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if, for every player i = 1, . . . , C
ri(Wi,W−i) ≥ ri(W
′
i ,W−i)
for all W
′
i ∈ Si, where Si is a strategy set of player i and
W−i = (W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WC).
In other words, no player has an incentive to unilater-
ally change his strategy. Assuming that players are self-
ish (i.e., each player aims at maximizing his received
throughput), the network is expected to operate at a
Nash equilibrium point (the player’s best response to
other players’ strategies). In this subsection, we first in-
vestigate whether a Nash equilibrium point exists for the
system or not. We will study the existence of a Nash equi-
librium point by making use of the concept of a player’s
best-response function (correspondence) [19].
Definition 2. We say that player i’s best-response
correspondence bi : S−i → Si, is the correspondence that
assigns to each W−i ∈ S−i the set bW−i = {Wi ∈ Si :
Ui(Wi,W−i) ≥ Ui(W
′
i ,W−i) for all W
′
i ∈ Si}.
Now, we can restate the definition of a Nash equilibrium
as follows: The strategy profile W = (W1, . . . ,WC) is a
Nash equilibrium of our game if and only if Wi ∈ bW−i
for i = 1, . . . , C.
Proposition 1 (Static game). For any strategy
profile W = (W1, . . . ,WC) that constitutes a Nash equi-
librium, ∃i s.t. Wi = 1.
Proof. We prove this proposition by making use of
the player’s best-response correspondence. Assume W =
(W1, . . . ,WC) is such that Wj > 1, j = 1, . . . , C. Now,
take one player, say i, and try to calculate his best-
response correspondence. Thus, bW−i = {Wi ∈ Si :
Ui(Wi,W−i) ≥ Ui(W
′
i ,W−i) for all W
′
i ∈ Si} = {Wi ∈
Si : ri(Wi,W−i) ≥ ri(W
′
i ,W−i) for all W
′
i ∈ Si}. Since
ri is a decreasing function of Wi (equation (9) and as-
sumption Wj > 1 (τ
c
j < 1; equation (4)), j = 1, . . . , C),
it readily follows that the only value for Wi that satisfies
ri(Wi,W−i) ≥ ri(W
′
i ,W−i) for all W
′
i ∈ Si, is unity (i.e.,
Wi = 1). Finally, assuming that τ
c
k = 1 for some player
k, the proposition follows trivially from equation (4).
Proposition 2. There exists an infinite number of
Nash equilibria.
Proof. Assume that for player i we have Wi = 1.
Then his access probability τ ci = 1 and consequently for
all players j 6= i, p−j = (1−τ
c
i )
∏
k 6=j,i(1−τ
c
k) = 0. From
equation (7) it follows that rj = 0 (j 6= i) for any value
of Wj . Thus for any value of Wj we have Wj ∈ bW−j .
This is clearly true for any number of players who have
their contention window set to 1.
Proposition 1 gives us an insight into the characteristics
of Nash equilibria points. It is interesting to notice that
the equilibria can be classified in the two following fami-
lies: (i) In the first family, there is only one selfish player
i who receives a non-null throughput ri > 0 and for all
other players j we have rj = 0; (ii) In the second fam-
ily, we have more than one selfish node, in which case
rk = 0, for k = 1, . . . , C. Since we assume that each
cheater strives to attain the most of the channel capac-
ity, the most likely equilibrium is the one at which all
cheaters have the size of the contention window Wi set
to unity.
Corollary 1. In the presence of more than one
cheater, each player’s payoff is zero (ri = 0, i =
1, . . . , C).
This corollary implies that multiple cheaters in the sys-
tem will eventually converge to the Nash equilibrium
point of the static game where they will obtain no pay-
off. Thus, selfish behavior by multiple cheaters in the
system results in disaster for every cheater in the sys-
tem! This result is know as a tragedy of commons in
game theory [19].
In this section, we concluded that when there is no ex-
plicit (or implicit) cooperation between cheaters, the sys-
tem is headed towards collapse. In Section 5, we will show
that more desirable outcomes are possible when cheaters
take into consideration the moves of other cheaters. In
this direction, in the following section, we first define
what we mean by an optimal (and efficient) point of op-
eration.
4.3 Pareto-optimal point of operation
According to the analysis of the earlier section, there
exists a Nash equilibrium point at which all cheaters have
their Wi equal to 1, i.e., every cheater simultaneously
tries to access the channel all the time, which results in
repeated collisions. This is clearly inefficient and leads
us to question whether anything better can be achieved
or not.
To investigate further, let us temporarily remove the as-
sumption that every cheater acts independently of the
presence of other cheaters. If a cheater is aware of the
presence of another cheater in the system, operating at
Wi = 1 is not the best strategy, as it results in a zero pay-
off for both cheaters. The situation is analogous to the
problem of the Prisoner’s Dilemma [19] in game theory.
Let us first investigate whether there exists a value ofWi
such that a better throughput can be achieved. We con-
sider a hypothetical scenario where all the cheaters use
the same valueWi =W and modify it in synchronization
with the other cheaters in the system.
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Figure 3: Throughput vs. contention window
size of the cheaters (20 nodes, out of which 10
cheaters)
The simulation set up consists of N = 20 nodes out of
which C = 10 nodes. The simulation parameters are the
same as in Section 4.1 (Table 1). Figure 3 plots the aver-
age throughput obtained by a cheater at different values
of W , from simulations and from the analytical model
described in Section 4.1. The results are averaged over
5 simulation runs. Figure 3 confirms that operating at
W = 1 leads to network collapse. However, there exists
an optimal point of operation (W = 27) at which the
throughput is maximized for every cheater in the sys-
tem. We refer to this optimal point of operation as W ∗.
For W < W ∗, congestion dominates and results in lower
throughput, whereas forW > W ∗, the system is not used
to its full potential. Thus, besides trying to maximize his
own probability of accessing the channel, a cheater coop-
erates by giving sufficient opportunities to other cheaters
to access the channel.
The results obtained by simulations show a good match
with the analytical results, that were obtained using
Bianchi’s model (in Matlab). There is a slight discrep-
ancy at low values of W , as Bianchi’s model holds only
for large values of N and W .
Stability analysis. We investigate the stability of this
optimal point of operation from a game theory perspec-
tive. We want to verify whether W ∗ corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium for the system or not. To do this, we
now observe the payoff obtained by a single cheater when
it unilaterally deviates from the optimal point of opera-
tion. We use the same simulation setup (N=20, C=10).
We fix up a simulation seed and run a similar simulation
as mentioned in the previous section to calculate the op-
timal value of W , W ∗ = 27. A cheater (designated as
node X) is randomly chosen and is made to unilaterally
deviate from this optimal W ∗ value of 27. Figure 4 plots
the throughput obtained by cheater X at different values
of X’s contention window, WX . All the other cheaters
in the system keep their contention window size fixed,
equal to W ∗ = 27. Note that unlike previous figures,
Figure 4 plots the results obtained by a single simulation
run. This is because a Nash equilibrium is defined for an
instance of a static game. An average Nash equilibrium
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Figure 4: Unilateral deviation by a cheater from
the optimal point of operation
point does not have any physical significance.
As can be observed from Figure 4, if the cheater X devi-
ates towards the right (WX > 27), he suffers a decrease in
throughput but if he deviates towards the left (WX < 27)
he enjoys an increase of his throughput. This means that
a unilateral deviation from the optimal point of opera-
tion results in a better payoff for player X and hence it
is not a Nash equilibrium point (which is in accordance
with our findings in Section 4.2).
However, the deviating player X gets this payoff at the
cost of other player(s) (other cheaters) and hence this
point is Pareto optimal [20]. A Pareto optimal point
means that it is impossible to move from that point in
such a manner that the payoff enjoyed by other cheaters
does not change. Moreover, the payoff of every cheater
is maximized simultaneously. We further note that all
points W ≤ W ∗ are Pareto optimal. However, as shown
in Figure 3, the cheaters payoff is maximized for a single
Pareto optimal point (W = W ∗). We also note that
W = W ∗ is the only point for which a max-min fair
allocation [21] of the system capacity is achieved. It is
this point that we call the optimal and efficient point of
operation, or shortly Pareto optimal point.
In our context, this is significant since: (i) W ∗ is not
a Nash equilibrium point, but it is Pareto optimal; (ii)
W = 1 is a Nash equilibrium point but is not Pareto
optimal (efficient). This creates a dilemma for a system
with multiple cheaters, where we look for a Nash equilib-
rim point of operation which is also Pareto optimal and
efficient.
5. STUDY OF A DYNAMIC GAME
Having determined the Pareto-optimal pointW ∗, we now
intend to devise a strategy allowing the cheaters to con-
verge to this point. For this purpose, we make use of the
theory of dynamic and repeated games [22, 19]. These
kind of games capture the idea that a player is allowed
to use strategy that depends on previous actions. Using
the dynamic game model, we devise a simple distributed
algorithm that adopted by the cheaters converges to a
desired Nash equilibrium point. In this section, we as-
sume, without any loss of generality, that the cheaters
6
can directly manipulate their accessing probabilities τi,
rather than their respective contention windows Wi; in-
deed, accessing probabilities and contention windows are
interchangeable by means of the Bianchi’s model.
5.1 Game formulation
We extend the game theory model introduced in Sec-
tion 4.1 to a dynamic game model in which the players
are allowed to make their decisions based on previous ac-
tions and system states. We assume that our dynamic
game is played infinitely long. We also assume all the
nodes to be cheaters, i.e., C = N . Let C denote the set
comprising all the cheaters. In the new game theoretic
model the cheater’s (player’s) utility function Ji takes
the following form:
Ji = Ui − Pi, (10)
where Pi denotes a penalty function. Let us, for the
moment, assume that Pi is defined to be:
Pi = ki(τi − τ), ki ≥ 0, τ ∈ (0, 1), (11)
with ki and τ are constants imposed on player i. Note
that we assume Pi can be negative; we will show in Sec-
tion 5.3 that with an appropriate selection of ki we always
have Pi ≥ 0 (i.e., τi ≥ τ). In this section, the definition of
Pi, (as well as ki and τ), is used as a mathematical tool
to derive optimality conditions for the players; later in
Section 5.3, we discuss practical interpretations of values
ki and τ .
Combining equations (10), (11) and (7) (definition of Ui)
we can define the following non-cooperative game:
max
0≤τi≤1
Ji =
τic
i
1
τici2 + c
i
3
− ki(τi − τ), ∀i ∈ C. (12)
In order to solve the maximization problem (12), we de-
fine the Lagrangian function L(τi, λi) for each player i
as
L(τi, λi) = Ji(τi) + λi(1− τi) (13)
where λi ≥ 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. Based on the
Lagrangian function L(τi, λi), we can obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions for Ji to be maximized for each
player i ∈ C. It is known from the convex optimization
theory (with inequality constraints) that in order for the
Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions to be sufficient for Ji
to be maximized, Ji has to be a concave function, whereas
constraint τi ≤ 1 has to be convex (or quasiconvex) [23].
Indeed, τi ≤ 1 is convex. Furthermore, for T
s = T c, Ji is
a concave function in τi; i.e.,
∂2Ji
∂τ2
i
= −
2ci
1
ci
2
ci
3
(τici2+c
i
3
)3
≤ 0. As
can be seen from Figure 5, the assumption that T s = T c
results in a negligible decrease in the player’s payoff at the
optimal value of τi with respect to his payoff achieved for
T s > T c. Now, for each player i, the sufficient conditions
for Ji to be maximized are:
∂Ji
∂τi
− λi ≤ 0, τi ≥ 0 and τi
(
∂Ji
∂τi
− λi
)
= 0
τi ≤ 1, λi ≥ 0 and λi(τi − 1) = 0.
(14)
Solving system (14), we obtain the following optimal-
ity conditions for player i: (i) τi = 0 if
∂Ji
∂τi
≤ 0; (ii)
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Figure 5: Payoffs achieved for T s = T c and T s > T c
(10 cheaters, τi = τj , ∀i, j ∈ C)
τi ∈ (0, 1) if
∂Ji
∂τi
= 0 and (iii) τi = 1 if
∂Ji
∂τi
≥ 0. Let us
replace τi in equation (12) by γi ∈ R (note that we can
have γi < 0 or γi > 1). Let γ
∗
i denote the solution to
equation ∂Ji
∂γi
= 0, i.e.,
γ∗i =
1
ci2
(√ci1ci3
ki
− ci3
)
. (15)
It can be shown4 that the optimality conditions derived
above are all expressible in terms of γ∗i as stated below:
Lemma 1. Assume T s = T c. Then for each player i,
a strategy prescribing: (i) play τi = 0 if γ
∗
i < 0, (ii) play
τi = γ
∗
i if γ
∗
i ∈ [0, 1], and (iii) play τi = 1 if γ
∗
i > 1, is a
unique Nash equilibrium strategy for the game (12).
It is interesting to note that even if T s > T c, it still
can be shown that by an appropriate selection of penalty
constant ki the optimality conditions of Lemma 1 still
hold.
5.2 Equilibria of a dynamic game
Lemma 1 reveals an interesting point about our
game (12): If we can find conditions for which γ∗i ∈ (0, 1)
for all players i ∈ C, then no player i will ever play τi = 1
(i.e., the network will not collapse). We extend this ob-
servation in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Any profile τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τC), with
τi ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ C, can be supported as a Nash equilib-
rium point of the game (12).
Proof. First note that in CSMA/CA networks only
one station can transmit successfully at a time. This
separation allows us to inflict a penalty on one player
without affecting any other player.
Since τi ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ C, the following is satisfied: c
i
1 > 0,
ci2 > 0 and c
i
3 > 0. By taking the derivative of γ
∗
i with
4We omit the proof due to the lack of space.
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respect to ki we obtain:
∂γ∗i
∂ki
= − 1
2ci
2
√
ci
1
ci
3
k3
i
< 0, i.e., γ∗i
is a decreasing function in ki. Actually,
∂γ∗i
∂ki
= 0 only for
ki = ∞. We further observe that limki→0 γ
∗
i = ∞ and
limki→∞ γ
∗
i = −
c3
c2
. Since γ∗i is a decreasing function
in ki that takes values from interval I = [∞,−
c3
c2
], we
conclude that there exists 0 < ki <∞ that generates an
arbitrary γ∗i ∈ (0, 1) ⊆ I. But this value of γ
∗
i is a Nash
equilibrium of our game according to Lemma 1, which
concludes the proof.
This type of result is similar to the Nash Folk theorem
in economics [19]. In the following section, using insights
from Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, we show how to con-
vert an arbitrary profile τ = (τ , . . . , τ), τ ∈ (0, 1), into a
unique Nash equilibrium. We also propose a simple al-
gorithm that converges to this unique equilibrium point.
5.3 Achieving a Nash equilibrium point
Let us assume that we want to convert τi = τ ∈
(0, 1), ∀i ∈ C to a unique Nash equilibrium point.
Assume first that T s = T c. Then we know from
Lemma 1 that at a Nash equilibrium τi should satisfy
equation (15). As we want to make τ a Nash equilibrium,
we simply set γ∗i = τ . Then rewrite (15) and obtain:
ki =
ci1c
i
3
(τci2 + c
i
3)
2
. (16)
Thus, the player i’s payoff function becomes:
Ji =
τic
i
1
τici2 + c
i
3
−
ci1c
i
3
(τci2 + c
i
3)
2
(τi − τ). (17)
An example of Ji is shown in Figure 6. Note that at the
Nash equilibrium point τ the following holds: Ji(τ) =
Ui(τ). It is interesting to notice that even if Pi takes
negative values for τi < τ , in which case Pi can be seen as
a reward function, the best choice for the node is still τi =
τ , where Pi = 0. This suggests the following redefinition
of player i’s payoff function Ji:
Ji =
τic
i
1
τici2 + c
i
3
−
ci1c
i
3
(τci2 + c
i
3)
2
×
{
(τi − τ), τi ≥ τ ;
0, τi < τ .
.
(18)
Thus, by an appropriate selection of ki, we have made
τ a unique Nash equilibrium for all players i ∈ C. Next
we describe a simple algorithm that leads the players to
the unique Nash equilibrium point τ . Let us assume, for
the moment, that penalty functions Pi, ∀i ∈ C are eval-
uated and inflicted on the players by some oracle. Later
in this section, we will show how the role of the oracle
can be delegated to the players themselves, in which case
our algorithm turns into a distributed algorithm. As-
sume also the players’ payoff function is given by equa-
tion (17). Consider the following algorithm followed by
each player i ∈ C:
τ˙i
4
=
dτi
dt
=
∂Ji
∂τi
. (19)
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Figure 6: Plot of payoff, utility and penalty
functions (10 cheaters, τ = 0.02, τi = τ for i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 7}, τ8 = 0.027 and τ9 = 0.04)
Proposition 4. Algorithm (19) converges to a unique
Nash equilibrium τi = τ , ∀i ∈ C.
Proof. Following Lyapunov stability theory [24], we
first define function V (τ ) = 12
∑
i∈C τ
2
i . Now shift
V (τ ) to an equilibrium point τ to obtain V (τ − τ ) =
1
2
∑
i∈C(τi − τ)
2. Note that V (τ − τ ) is positive def-
inite, since V (τ − τ ) > 0 except for τ = τ (i.e.,
V (0) = 0). Next we take the derivative of V (τ − τ )
to obtain V˙ (τ − τ ) =
∑
i∈C(τi − τ)τ˙i. Combining this
with algorithm (19) leads to:
V˙ (τ−τ ) =
∑
i∈C
(τi−τ)
[ ci1ci3
(τici2 + c
i
3)
2
−
ci1c
i
3
(τci2 + c
i
3)
2
]
(20)
From equation (20) we can conclude that V˙ (τ − τ ) < 0
if τi < τ or τi > τ , while V˙ (τ − τ ) = 0 only if τi = τ ,
∀i ∈ C. Therefore, by Lyapunov stability theorem [24],
algorithm (19) converges to τ that is a globally asymp-
totically stable equilibrium point.
We observe here that by taking Ji as defined in (18),
all the results obtained for the payoff as defined by (17)
still hold: (i) τ is still a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) the
algorithm (19) (its discrete version) converges to τ . To
see that this is indeed the case, it suffices to observe that
for (17) we have Pi = 0 at the Nash equilibrium, whereas
for Pi < 0 (τi < τ) we have Ui − Pi > Ui, i.e., in both
cases player i has no incentive to stay at τi < τ (see
Figure 6).
Next we show how to delegate the role of the oracle to the
cheaters themselves and thus convert algorithm (19) to a
distributed algorithm. We saw that the role of the oracle
is: (i) to correctly estimate the penalty function Pi, and
(ii) to apply Pi afterwards. Therefore, in order to be able
to delegate these tasks to the players, we have to develop
an appropriate penalization mechanism as well as a de-
tection mechanism to be used by the players. Recall that
the punishment Pi of any player i ∈ C should not affect
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any other player’s payoff (as stated in the proof of Propo-
sition 3)). This for example can be done by selectively
jamming player i’s packets. We study the penalization
and detection mechanisms in more detail in Section 6.
A still pending question is: how do the players agree
on the Nash equilibrium point τ ∈ (0, 1) to which they
all should converge? A simple way to resolve this is to
define:
τ
4
= min
k∈C
τk, (21)
in which case Pi can be seen as a penalty that a player
with the lowest accessing probability τj = τ (the highest
contention window Wj) inflicts on player i. Note that
player i is indeed able to determine τj ,∀i ∈ C; player i is
equipped with an appropriate detection mechanism (Sec-
tion 6). A potential problem with definition (21) is that
by following algorithm (19) everyone are guided to τ → 0.
This happens because any player i playing τi < τ defines
new τ and in turn penalizes all the other players thus
guiding them to the new equilibrium point. To overcome
this potential danger, we impose the following constraint
on all the players:
Remark 1. While running the adaptive strategy as
suggested in algorithm (19), a player must not use the
penalization mechanism.
Note that the player i satisfying i = argmink∈C τk does
not use the adaptive strategy of algorithm (19), since i
knows, by means of the detection mechanism, the he has
the lowest access probability.
The remaining challenge of how to achieve the most ef-
ficient τ , i.e., the Pareto-optimal point in the sense of
Section 4.3, we study in the following section.
5.4 Achieving the Pareto-optimal point
Let τ∗i denote the value of τi at which the cheaters jointly
(i.e., τi = τj , ∀i, j ∈ C) maximize their respective payoffs.
To lead the cheaters to the Pareto-optimal point, we use
the fact that the first derivative of Ji with respect to τi
changes sign at τ∗ when τi = τj , ∀i, j ∈ C (see Figure 5).
For this reason we term our algorithm Gradient-search
mechanism (Gsm). In a nutshell, Gsm works as follows.
The cheaters are running algorithm (19) until they sta-
bilize at some equilibrium point τi = τ , ∀i ∈ C. One
player, say i, will eventually decrease τi by some value
δ. This will in turn trigger the penalizing mechanism
of player i and pull the other players to a new equilib-
rium point, since they run algorithm (19). At this stage,
each player will compare its current payoff Jj (at the
new Nash equilibrium point) to the payoff Joldj achieved
at the previous Nash equilibrium point. If Jj − J
old
j < 0,
the players terminate Gsm, since they have reached close
proximity of the Pareto-optimal point. Since every point
at which the players stabilize is a Nash equilibrium point
(Proposition 4), we have achieved our goal of making the
Pareto-optimal point a Nash equilibrium point. In Sec-
tions 6 and 7 we elaborate Gsm algorithm in more detail.
There we also study convergence and stability properties
of Gsm.
One important point to notice about Gsm is that it re-
quires players to deviate from a Nash equilibrium point
to reach the Pareto equilibrium point. At the first sight
this may look confusing: why should any player devi-
ate from a Nash equilibrium point? The answer here
is simple. The game in our new model is played in-
finitely long (an infinitely repeated game). For this rea-
son, the players can afford themselves any finite num-
ber (k < ∞) of deviations from a Nash equilibrium
point (e.g., for 0 < k < ∞, limT→∞
∑T
t=k J
t
i /T =
limT→∞
∑T
t=0 J
t
i /T ). Being aware of the existence of
the Pareto-optimal point τ∗, the players clearly have in-
centive to follow our protocol and achieve better payoffs
(> 0) than the one predicted by Corollary 1.
6. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we move beyond the realms of theoretical
results towards a prototype implementation of an efficient
cheating protocol in the context of ad-hoc networks.
In general, nodes do not have direct control over there ac-
cess probability. They can only change their contention
window sizes. We note that Bianchi’s model provides
a one-to-one relationship between access probability and
contention window size. This allows us to make a direct
transition from access probability to contention window
size; there exists W (corresponding to τ) and W ∗i (cor-
responding to τ∗i ) at which Nash equilibrium and Pareto
equilibrium can be achieved respectively.
The two key building blocks for the model of repeated
games are the detection mechanism and the penalizing
mechanism. In this section we will propose a distributed
implementation of these building blocks, where each node
take a decision solely based on its local information.
6.1 Detection mechanism
A non-cooperative cheater increases its access probabil-
ity, τi, by decreasing the contention window size below
the equilibrium point, Wi < W . As a result, it gets
more throughput (payoff) than other cheaters in the sys-
tem. We use this difference in throughputs as the met-
ric for gauging the magnitude of misbehavior by a non-
cooperative cheater.
We use the simple approach of communist fairness as
the detection scheme: Every cheater must get the same
throughput at the point of equilibrium. This property
follows from equations (3) and (4); all cheaters with
similar traffic constraints and same Wi should get sim-
ilar throughputs. Note that at the point of equilibrium
Wi = W, ∀i ∈ C . Each node measures the through-
put of all nodes, including itself. This is indeed feasible
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. If
a node observes a difference in throughputs with some
other node, it characterizes the other node as the misbe-
having cheater.
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Figure 7: Performance of cheating detection
based on throughput measurements
Let ri and rj be the measured throughput of nodes i
and j, respectively. Due to the inherent unfairness of
the IEEE 802.11 MAC [25], and to increase the efficiency
of the detection mechanism, we introduce two parame-
ters: the observation time-window size Tobs, in seconds,
and the tolerance margin ², in percentage of throughput.
After measuring the throughput of each node for Tobs
seconds, node i detects that node j is deviating when-
ever the throughput of node j exceeds the one of node i
i.e., rj/ri > 1 + ².
We have implemented this detection mechanism in ns-
2, with N = C = 30 nodes. We vary the contention
window size (Wj) of a single node j, while setting oth-
ers’ contention window sizes to 30 (W−j = 30). Figure
7 shows the performance of the detection mechanism for
different values of Tobs and ². The probability of false
positives corresponds to the detection probability read
at Wj = 30 only; at this point, node j uses a contention
window value equal to that of node i, but still gets a
higher throughput, rj/ri = 1.06, due to the IEEE 802.11
unfairness. Therefore node j gets detected as deviating
(detection probability > 0). To reduce the false positives
(at contention window size 30), one can consider large ²
values (> 10%). However, this comes at the expense of
lower detection probabilities if cheater j uses contention
window sizes slightly lower than 30. Similarly, large Tobs
values (≥ 15s) will reduce the effect of the inherent IEEE
802.11 unfairness, and therefore the corresponding false
positives. This also comes at the expense of lower de-
tection probabilities if cheater j uses contention window
sizes slightly lower than 30. Therefore, choosing appro-
priate values for Tobs and ² is crucial to our detection
mechanism. For very low contention window sizes of
cheater j (Wj ≤ 20), the throughput ratio rj/ri is much
larger than 1 + ², easily detecting cheater j’s deviation.
The detection mechanism works on the simple principle
of communist fairness i.e., every cheater in the system
should get the same throughput. Besides being simple,
this detection mechanism is also flexible. It can be used
even if cheaters adopt a different cheating model for ex-
ample abusing the DIFS duration. Moreover, even if
different cheaters in the system use different models for
cheating, the same detection mechanism can be used for
all of them. Note that our detection mechanism assumes
homogeneous conditions among the cheaters in the sys-
tem i.e., similar traffic constraint and channel conditions.
In Section 7.3, we discuss how this assumption can be re-
laxed.
Related security and detection issues. The detec-
tion mechanisms explored so far assume that nodes main-
tain a consistent and unique identity at the MAC layer.
Thus, they are not robust to the sybil attack [26]. We will
require a MAC layer authentication scheme to counter
such attacks [27]. Another possibility is to consider a
game in which a node plays against all others (i.e., the
network as a whole), which requires no authentication of
other players. However, this game shows relatively low
stability and efficiency of the network throughput.
6.2 Penalizing mechanism
The action taken by cheaters in response to non-
cooperation by another cheater is termed as penalizing
mechanism. In Section 5, we called the resultant cost
of this penalizing scheme (imposed by other nodes) on a
node as the penalty function. We noted that penalizing
scheme should be designed so that it does not brings any
performance degradation on the imposing nodes.
This can be achieved by selectively jamming the misbe-
having cheater nodes packets. Again, this is made fea-
sible by the broadcast nature of the wireless medium.
We have designed a simple penalizing scheme, in which
the packets of the non-cooperative cheater are selectively
jammed for a short duration of time, Tjam, by the other
cheaters in the system. Suppose cheater i detects the
presence of a non-cooperative cheater j. Thereafter, if
node i listens to a transmitted packet corresponding to
node j, it switches to transmission mode and jams enough
bits so that the packet cannot be recovered at the re-
ceiver. Meanwhile, all other nodes in the system should
be able to read the header of the jammed frame and prop-
erly update their NAV (network allocation vector). This
is to avoid waiting for EIFS [14] which reduces the sys-
tem’s efficiency. Therefore, jamming should be done on
frame payloads rather than frame headers. This is indeed
possible since the transceiver’s turnaround time, which is
of the order of 5 µs [14], is much shorter than the data
frame transmission time, which is of the order of 700 µs.
Let the throughput obtained by the two considered nodes
over the last observation window, Tobs, be ri and rj ,
respectively, where rj/ri > 1 + ². As we saw in Sec-
tion 5, the penalizing mechanism is aimed at guiding the
cheaters to the same Nash equilibrium point. Thus, the
throughput received by nodes i and j should be the same
over the total time duration of Tobs + Tjam. Node i cal-
culates the value of Tjam as follows:
ri × Tobs + ri × Tjam = rj × Tobs + 0× Tjam
Tjam =
(rj−ri)
ri
× Tobs =
(
rj
ri
− 1
)
× Tobs
(22)
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Figure 8: Throughput obtained by cheaters over
time, in presence of a non-cooperative cheater X
and the jamming mechanism
Note that during the jamming duration, node j gets no
throughput and node i will continue to get a through-
put of ri. Some of the key features of this penalizing
mechanism are as follows:
(a) The jamming mechanism is self-adaptive, i.e., the
amount of penalty imposed on a non-cooperative cheater
(Tjam) is directly proportional to his level of misbehavior(
rj/ri − 1
)
.
(b) The responsibility of jamming the packets is collec-
tively carried out by all the cheaters in the system. More-
over, every cheater takes his own independent decision
about jamming the non-cooperative cheater, just relying
on his local information. Thus the proposed jamming
mechanism is completely distributed.
(c) The proposed jamming mechanism is completely
anonymous. A penalized node cannot know the iden-
tity of the penalizing node. This prevents the node from
retaliating against a specific node in the system. In the
worst case, it can retaliate against every other cheater in
the system. However, as shown earlier, such a malicious
behavior will eventually result in a total network collapse
(the Nash equilibrium of a static game).
Normally, jamming is associated with malicious behavior
in the system. In this context, the introduction of jam-
ming looks counterintuitive considering the assumption
of rational cheaters in the system. However, in our pro-
posed mechanism, cheaters use jamming just to support
better outcomes than those obtained in the static game
(Corollary 1). Thus, the proposed jamming mechanism
is consistent with the rational goal of maximizing one’s
own throughput.
Instead of using the penalizing mechanism, some re-
searchers introduced the notion of cost for reaching a sta-
ble point of operation. In [2, 1], battery power is used as
a cost mechanism. However, such a mechanism relies on
the participating players to respect this cost mechanism,
making it susceptible to be abused by non-cooperative
cheaters. Jamming is a mutual cost imposed by other
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Figure 9: Unilateral deviation by a cheater be-
fore and after the introduction of the penalizing
scheme
players and is not controlled by the player himself. This
makes it an imposed cost for each non-cooperative player,
ensuring that the system has a stable point of operation.
We have implemented the jamming mechanism in ns-
2. The simulation setup is the same as in Section 4.3
(N = 20, C = 10). We randomly pick up a cheater, desig-
nated as nodeX, and fix his contention window size to be
10. The contention window size for all the other cheaters
in the system is fixed to the Pareto-optimal (W ∗) value
of 30. Figure 8 plots the obtained throughput by the
cheaters in the system over time, with and without the
penalizing scheme. We use the observation window size,
Tobs, of 20 seconds, and the tolerance margin, ², of 0.5 in
the detection mechanism. As can be observed from Fig-
ure 8, node X gets detected by other cheaters in the sys-
tem and is penalized for its misbehavior. The through-
put of node X drops then to 0. Thus, the detection
and penalizing schemes are successful in preventing the
non-cooperative cheater from obtaining higher through-
put than other cheaters in the system.
We next carry out a similar stability analysis as in Sec-
tion 4.3 for the system with the detection and penaliz-
ing scheme. Figure 9 plots the average throughput ob-
tained by cheater node X, when it unilaterally deviates
from the Pareto-optimal point of operation (W ∗ = 30).
The results are averaged over a duration of 1000 seconds.
As can be observed from Figure 9, after the introduc-
tion of the detection and penalizing scheme, cheater X
gets maximum throughput by operating at the Pareto-
optimal point of operation. Any unilateral deviation
from this point, WX < W
∗ or WX > W
∗, brings less
payoff (throughput) for cheater X. No cheater will have
any incentive for deviating unilaterally from the Pareto-
optimal point of operation and hence it is at Nash equi-
librium.
Last, we should note that the penalizing scheme, pro-
posed here for throughput-based detection, can be easily
adapted to work with any other detection mechanism.
7. DISTRIBUTED CHEATING PROTOCOL
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Figure 10: Performance of system with adaptive strategy
In this section, we will build a comprehensive, distributed
and efficient cheating protocol on the two building blocks
mentioned in the previous section. We are still miss-
ing one key element in the protocol design What action
nodes take after getting penalized by other nodes in the
network? We call the scheme followed by the misbehav-
ing nodes as the adaptive strategy.
7.1 Adaptive strategy
Adaptive strategy is inspired by algorithm (19). When a
cheater observes that he is being jammed consecutively
for ∆ seconds, he gradually increases his contention win-
dow by steps of size γ. Note that a cheater can eas-
ily decide whether he is being jammed by observing his
own throughput. The choice of ∆ determines the effi-
ciency of the system. A high value of ∆ might let a non-
cooperative cheater escape from being penalized. How-
ever, choosing a small value of ∆ might magnify the effect
of misdetection by unnecessarily causing a cheater to in-
crease his contention window size. This will eventually
lead the whole system towards an inefficient point of op-
eration. The choice of the step size, γ, offers a tradeoff
between convergence time and efficiency. If we increase
the contention window in large steps, though the system
will stabilize in less time, the point of operation might be
far away from the Pareto-optimal point (W ∗), resulting
in an inefficient system and vice-versa.
We have implemented this adaptive strategy in ns-2. The
simulation setup is the same as in the previous section
(N = 20, C = 10,W ∗ = 30). We randomly pick up a
cheater, designated as node X, and fix his contention
window size to 10. The contention window size for all
the other cheaters in the system is fixed to W ∗. We fix
∆ to be 5 seconds and γ to be 5. Figure 10(a) plots the
obtained throughput by different cheaters in the system
over time. Figure 10(b) plots the evolution of contention
window size of node X over time. As can be observed
from Figure 10(b), node X adapts its contention window
size following the adaptive strategy and eventually con-
verges to a window size of 30, equal to W ∗. Thus the
other cheaters in the system are successful in guiding the
Table 2: Throughput obtained by different nodes
(bytes/s)
Strategy
Non-adaptive Adaptive
Cheater X 7650 11577
Other cheaters 7826 11448
Well-behaved nodes 1286 2318
misbehaving cheater to reach the optimal point of opera-
tion. As can be seen from Figure 10(b), node X reaches
this point at around 300s. Thereafter, the system con-
tinues to operate at this stable point of operation. Table
2 summarizes the average throughput obtained by differ-
ent nodes over a time interval of 1000 seconds. As can
be observed from Table 2, the jamming and detection
mechanism combined with the adaptive strategy, besides
being fair to all the cheaters in the system, is also the
most efficient.
Note that even the introduction of the adaptive strat-
egy does not encourage the abuse of jamming. Cheater
X might try to unnecessarily jam other cheaters, hop-
ing that an increase in the contention window sizes by
all the cheaters (following the adaptive strategy) will get
him more throughput. However, eventually cheater X
will be identified as a misbehaving cheater, because of
the throughput difference, by the other cheaters in the
system. In turn, cheater X will be forced to increase
his own contention window size, following the penaliz-
ing mechanism. As a result, every cheater i, including
cheater X, will now be operating at an inefficient point
of operation (Wi > W
∗). Thus cheaters have no incentive
to over-jam other cheaters in the system.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our protocol in
a scenario consisting of multiple levels of misbehavior in
the system. The simulation setup is the same as in the
previous section (N = 20, C = 10,W ∗ = 30). We ran-
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Table 3: Throughput obtained by different nodes
(bytes/s) with multiple levels of misbehavior
Strategy
Non-adaptive Adaptive
Cheater X 2843 10356
Cheater Y 2686 10185
Cheater Z 2565 10239
Other cheaters 2544 10172
Well-behaved nodes 270 1981
domly pick up three cheaters, designated as node X, Y
and Z respectively. We fix their contention window sizes
to be 5, 10 and 15, respectively. The contention window
size for all the other cheaters in the system is fixed toW ∗.
Figure 11 plots the evolution of the contention window
sizes of the different cheaters over time. Since different
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Figure 11: Performance of a system with varying
levels of misbehavior
cheaters are punished in proportion to their misbehav-
ior, every cheater eventually converges to W ∗ and the
system continues to operate at this stable point of op-
eration. Thus, our protocol self-adapts to the different
levels of misbehavior in the system. Table 3 summarizes
the average throughput obtained by different nodes over
an interval of 1000 seconds. As can be observed from Ta-
ble 3, the jamming mechanism combined with the adap-
tive strategy results in the optimal and fair performance,
even with multiple levels of misbehavior in the system.
7.2 Distributed Gradient-search mechanism
An accurate implementation of detection, penalizing and
adaptive strategy will lead the nodes to reach an equi-
librium point, W . However, the intention is to reach
the most efficient equilibrium point i.e the Pareto opti-
mal point of operation, W ∗. As mentioned in Section 5,
this can be achieved by using a simple Gradient Search
Mechanism.
At the onset of the system, Wi = W
in
i for all cheaters.
Every cheater sets up a random timer to increase his
contention window by step size, γ. One of the cheaters,
say X, will eventually increase his contention window
size to W inX + γ. Based on the detection mechanism,
node X will conclude that all other cheaters in the sys-
tem are deviating and will begin penalizing them. If a
cheater observes that he is being penalized, he will dis-
able the timer. Eventually the system will stabilize, when
Wi = W
in
i + γ for all cheaters. The cheaters realize
that they have reached a new stable point of operation,
when they all begin getting the same throughput. At
this point in time, a cheater i compares his throughput
at Wi = W
in
i + γ with the throughput at Wi = W
in
i . If
a cheater observes a decrease in his throughput, he will
terminate the search for W ∗. Otherwise he again sets
up the random timer to increase his contention window
size by γ. Note that even if only one cheater observes an
increase in his throughput, eventually the whole system
will move towards a new point of operation.
We have implemented this protocol in ns-2. The simu-
lation setup consists of 20 nodes and 7 cheaters (N =
20, C = 7). All the cheaters follow Protocol 1 above.
The cheaters initialize their contention window sizes to
5 (W ini = 5). The cheaters continue their search for
W ∗ only if they see an increase of 10% or more in their
throughput from the last stable point of operation. Fig-
ure 12(a) plots a sample evolution of the contention win-
dow for 2 cheaters, X and Y , in the system. Note that
all of the cheaters follow a similar pattern and eventu-
ally converge to a window size of 20. We are unable
to show their evolution in the same plot as it simply
generates overlapping lines. Figure 12(b) plots the aver-
age throughput obtained by the cheaters at different con-
tention window sizes. As can be seen from Figure 12(b),
the throughput is maximized at Wi = 20. In reality,
the cheaters will stop at Wi equal to 20 and the sys-
tem will continue to operate at this point of operation.
For completeness, we obtain the “dotted” curve in Fig-
ure 12(b) by deliberately forcing the cheaters to go be-
yond Wi = 20.
Next we evaluate the performance of our protocol by
varying the number of cheaters in the system. We run
our protocol and measure the window size at which all
the cheaters eventually converge. Thus, according to
our protocol, this point of convergence is the Pareto-
optimal point of operation. We evaluate the actual
Pareto-optimal point (W ∗), under the same network set-
tings, through ns-2 simulations (similar to Section 4.3).
We also evaluate the Pareto-optimal point (W ∗) analyt-
ically, using Bianchi’s model with Matlab. Figure 13
plots the obtained results. The results are averaged over
5 simulation runs. The results obtained by our proto-
col closely match the analytical results obtained using
Bianchi’s model. Note that the minimum resolution of
our protocol is equal to the step size, γ = 5. As can be
seen from Figure 13, the discrepancy is bounded by ±γ,
which clearly proves the efficiency of our protocol.
The protocol operates in a completely distributed man-
ner, without requiring any a priori knowledge about the
optimal point of operation or of the total number of
nodes/cheaters in the system. However, we rely on the
fact that the numbers of nodes and of cheaters does not
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Figure 12: Effect of the Smart cheating protocol, with N = 20 and C = 7. The axes in (b) are swapped
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change in the system. In general, ad hoc networks are
highly dynamic in nature, where new nodes/cheaters can
enter or existing nodes/cheaters can leave the system. In
order to cope with such uncertainties, we propose that
cheaters time out periodically and re-run the whole pro-
tocol from the beginning. Note that there can be tran-
sient phases during which the system operates at a sub-
optimal point of operation.
7.3 Discussion
As can be seen from Table 3, well-behaved nodes, which
continue to follow the IEEE 802.11 protocol, obtain negli-
gible throughput from the system. Thus, in the presence
of cheaters in the system, the only rational behavior for
the nodes (with the capability of cheating) is to adapt
and start using our protocol. Therefore, we speculate
that eventually all the nodes in the system will begin be-
having as cheaters. As we strive for optimal contention
window size, even in such a scenario, our protocol will be
at least as efficient as the normal IEEE 802.11 protocol.
Note that our goal in this paper is to save the network
from collapse, in an efficient way, rather than finding the
optimal contention window for a network ofN = C nodes
[28, 17]. However, our adaptive cheating algorithm leads
to the same optimal point, without explicit knowledge of
the number of contending nodes.
As mentioned earlier, we adopted throughput-based de-
tection to simplify the presentation. However, the use
of more adequate detection mechanisms, such as backoff-
based detection (i.e., comparing the nodes average back-
offs that do not depend on the traffic shape) is needed in
general, for example in the following scenarios:
(i) Hidden terminal problem. The throughput-based
detection mechanism relies on the “communist fairness”
that drives all the cheaters to the fairness with the least
throughput. Communist fairness may correspond to a
point of operation beyond the Pareto-optimal one. This
is typically the case of a node belonging to two different
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the number of cheaters
clusters, hidden to each other. The common node will
suffer unfair shares in both clusters, therefore it brings
the whole system to a sub-optimal point of operation. To
maximize the efficiency of a system with hidden nodes,
a detection mechanism based on max-min fairness [21]
can be used. This is the case of backoff-based detec-
tion mechanisms. On this “packet-scale” measurements,
the hidden node problem can be identified and avoided,
therefore enforcing max-min fairness while keeping the
system highly efficient.
(ii) Different traffic constraints. Since CSMA/CA is
time-fair rather than throughput-fair, flows with differ-
ent constraints (e.g., different packet lengths) will result
in different throughputs, even without cheating. Hence,
throughput-based detection mechanisms cannot be ap-
plied since nodes are not supposed to know each other’s
traffic constraints. Again, backoff-based detection mech-
anisms are more appropriate.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have addressed the problem of cheating
in CSMA/CA ad hoc networks. For this purpose, we
14
have developed a game-theoretical model and verified our
findings by appropriate simulations.
We have made several contributions. First, we have pro-
vided a formalism for the systematic study of rational
cheating. Second, we have studied the simple cases (i) of
a single cheater and (ii) of several cheaters acting without
restraint. Third, we have identified the Pareto-optimal
point of operation of a network with multiple cheaters.
Fourth, we have shown how it is possible to transform this
Pareto-optimal point into a Nash equilibrium. Fifth, we
have shown that smart cheaters can collectively find this
point.
We believe these contributions to be very relevant in ad
hoc networks, as each user can alter the behavior of his
or her own device.
In terms of future work, we intend to study in more de-
tail the solution we have proposed for the hidden termi-
nal problem. We will also try to define a punishment
technique which is less intrusive than jamming. Finally,
we intend to adapt this approach to problems beyond
CSMA/CA networks: first, we will study how smart
cheating could become a technique to collectively fine-
tune the behavior of a protocol; second, we intend to
apply this approach to other MAC protocols, including
those based on CDMA principles.
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